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LESSONSFORM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH FREE BANKING
ABSTRACT
Therehas been considerable interest in recent years in historical
experiments with "free banking." This paper examines once again
the American experiments in the decades before the Civil War, and
the recent literature on them. The lessons of this experience for
four issues are considered: (1) the appropriate mechanism for
controlling the monetary base, (2) the need for a lender of last
resort, (3) the costs and benefits of a bank issued currency, and





New Brunswick, NJ 089031. New interest in old institutions.
Twodecadesago the early history of American banking was dismissed as
an object of study for someone concerned about current monetary problems,
except perhaps as an object lesson about what can go wrong if the government
does not apply a stern regulatory hand to the banking system. An article
that appeared in Banker's Ma2azine in 1971 entitled "The Early Ways and
Crazy Days of Banking" (Lasdon 1971), accurately reflected contemporary
thinking. Since that time, as recently noted by Milton Friedman and Anna 3.
Schwartz (1986) a number of factors have produced a renewal of interest in
radical forms of banking regulation, and this period is now the object of
intense research in academic circles.
The most important force for change has been, of course, the continuing
failure of existing institutions to produce anything like price and output
stability. Interest in monetary reform tends to rise and fall with the rate
of inflation. But there have been a number of intellectual currents
(themselves partly reflecting economic conditions) that have contributed to
the new interest in 19th century American banking. One is the startling
suggestion by Fredrich Hayek (1976) that the path to monetary stability was
simply to open up banking, and the provision of the monetary base, to thesame competitive forces that operate effectively in other sectors of the
economy. Hayek sketched a counterfactual history of how competitive monetary
institutions might evolve once controls were lifted. This speculation
naturally encouraged attempts to find out whether actual systems when at
least partly free of regulatory constraints had evolved along the lines
Hayek predicted.
A second development has been the "rational expectations revolution."
It emphasized the importance of underlying monetary institutions in contrast
with current monetary policy, since it is the basic institutions that
ultimately determine expectations about future monetary and fiscal policies.
Growing out of the rational expectations revolution has been a distinct
approach, the Minnesota School, that stresses the "legal restrictions"
placed on the issue of fiat money, and the way in which those restrictions
influence the relationships among money, prices, and real output. Finally,
there is the development of what Tyler Cowen and Randal Krozner (1987) have
called the New Monetary Economics. Motivated in part by recent developments
in finance, as well as the other currents noted above, this literature, like
Hayek's work, speculates about how the economy would behave under radically
different monetary arrangements.
All of these developments are strong motives for academics who want to
test these ideas to turn to the history books to find monetary systems that
contain some of the features being discussed by the theorists. In many ways
there is no better period to examine than American banking in the nineteenth
century and particularly in the two and one half decades that preceeded the
American Civil War.
32. The Free Ranking Era
America did not begin its life as an independent nation with a strong
presumption toward laissez faire in banking. The Constitution did not say
anything directly about banking. It provided simply that states could not
issue bills of credit (paper money) and that the right to coin and regulate
currency (presumably the coinage) was reserved to the federal government.
Alexander Hamilton, the first secretary of the treasury proposed in 1790
that the U.S. create a state bank modelled in certain ways on the Rank of
England.
The following year the Congress chartered the First Bank of the U. S.to
last for a period of twenty years. When its charter caine up for renewal in
1811, there was opposition from a variety of sources including the concern
that the constitution did not specifically authorize a bank. The experience
of federal financial difficulties in the War of 1812, and the intervening
evolution of constitutional doctrines helped produce a new bank, the Second
Rank of the U.S. in 1816. Rut this bank too ran into considerable
opposition when it came up for renewal. This was the famous Bank War between
the pro-bank forces led by the president of the Second bank, Nicholas
Riddle, and the anti-bank forces led by president Andrew Jackson. The upshot
of the war was that the government's deposits were removed and the bank's
federal charter was not renewed. Although it survived for a time under a
Pennsylvannia charter, the Second Bank ceased to be a major force in
financial markets after 1836.
Under the Independent Treasury plan innaugurated in 1845 the divorce of
the federal government from banking was taken a step further. Under this
legislation the federal government was required tO receive and pay out only
4specie (gold and silver), and to keep surplus funds as specie in its own
vaults. Although practical neccesity, and certain exceptions introduced in
the law, made this divorce between the banking system and the treasury less
complete than it appears in a simple description, it is nevertheless true
that one would be hard pressed to find a period that matched the two decades
before the Civil War in terms of the degree of freedom permitted to private
banks.
The problem of regulating banking, then, was left during this period
entirely in the hands of the states. Ideas on banking were numerous and
vigorously pressed, and the states adopted a wide range of regulatory
systems. Some followed the lead established in the Independent Treasury and
tried to prohibit all banks, dr all new banks, and force people to deal in
specie. But increasingly the most popular form of legislation was the so-
called free banking law. This legislation, first adopted by Michigan and New
York in the late 1830s, and then by a large number of states in the lS5Os,
had two main provisions. (1) Entry into banking was open to all as long as
certain minimum requirements with respect to capital and other matters were
complied with. Under the older system of chartered banking (still the
dominant mode in many states), each bank required a separate charter from
the state legislature. (2) Bank notes intended to circulate from hand to
hand as money had to be redeemable in specie and backed by government bonds
(typically issued by the state where the bank was located). These bonds were
deposited with a state official who was empowered to sell the bonds and
redeem all the notes of a bank if one note was protusted for non-paynient.2
2Although all, free banking laws contained these two basic features they
differed in many particulars (for example, the type and amount of bondi
required to back a note). Some of these differences are important for
SObviously, as one can see from this brief description, banking during
this period was restricted in many ways; it was a far cry from pure laissez
faire. To emphasize this point it may be worth listing some of these
restrictions. (1) In states with free banking laws bank notes had to be
backed by government bonds. (2) Most states had usury laws. In some states,
moreover, the maximum that could be charged by banks was lower than the
maximum that applied to other lenders.3 (3) The basic monetary unit was the
dollar as defined and minted by the U.S. government. Nevertheless, as our
earlier discussion made clear, there were also many respects in which the
banking system was unusually free of federal regulation.
How well did this system work? Should we turn the clock back to the
free banking era? To give a tentative answer to these questions I will
examine the experience of these years for the light they throw on four
potential reforms of the monetary system that have drawn considerable
interest in recent years. (1) Should the current system for providing the
monetary base be replaced with a gold standard or some other commodity based
standard? (2) Should the current system in which the Federal Reserve
potentially acts as a lender of last resort be replaced with an alternative
system in which protection against bank rims is supplied by some
decentrailzed market mechanism? (3) Should banks be allowed to issue notes
that circulate from hand to hand as money? (4) Should free entry be
permitted into banking?
explaining the diversity of experience under the free banking laws.
3Hugh Rockoff, "Origins of the Usury Provision of the National Banking
Act," unpublished working paper (1988).
63. control of the Monetary Base.
The free banking system did not provide, it is important to emphasize,
a test of Hayek's speculation that banks freed of all governmental
restraints would begin to produce some new form of monetary base. Hayek (at
his most radical) imagined banks issuing their own monetary units. Citibank
might issue Citimoney, perhaps redeemable in some basket of commodities, but
not necessarily in a basket of commodities defined by the U.S. government.
On the contrary, free banking like all American systems during the
nineteenth century (except for the period of the War of 1812 and the period
of the Civil War) was based on an ultimate metallic monetary base; during
this period a bimetallic standard of gold and silver. The free banking era
can tell us something about how those systems work, but not about how free
banking might produce a private unit of account.
The free banking era witnessed one of the most important disturbances
of the metallic based systems of the nineteenth century: the inflation
produced by the great discoveries of gold in California in 1848 and
subsequently in Eastern Australia and elsewhere. The gold discoveries show
that even under a commodity standard severe shocks to the monetary system
can occur. In the actual circumstances that shock appears to have been
cushioned in the U.S. by a rapid growth in the demand for money. This is
illustrated in Table 1 which shows the monetary base, the stock of money,
three measures of prices, and real GNP from 1847 to 1859.
7Table 1
Money, Prices, and Related Variables, 1847-1859
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year MoneyaMonetary Wholesale Consumer GNP Real
Basea Price Price Deflatorb cNpc
Indexb Indexb
1847 267 109 104 99 87 2.666
1848 259 118 80 95 87 2.460
1849 316 149 79 92 85 2.664
1850 360 176 93 94 89 2.872
1851 409 191 90 92 87 2.977
1852 451 217 94 93 91 2.976
1853 505 220 99 93 96 3.179
1854 509 231 114 101 102 3.281
1855 535 230 124 104 105 3.479
1856 575 241 111 102 109 3.488
1857 477 248 137 105 105 3.941
1858 547 244 102 99 104 3.550
1859 565 233 107 100 98 4.029
aMillions of dollars
b1860100
CBillions of 1860 dollars
Sources. Column (1). Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, Monetary
Statistics of the United States: Estimates. Sources. Methods (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1970), Table 13, columns 5, 12, and 17, p. 222-
225. Column (2). Monetary Statistics, Table 13, columns 4 and 5, pp. 222-
224. Column (3). Walter Buckingham Smith and Arthur Harrison Cole,
Fluctuations in American Business. 1790-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1935), p. 167. Column (4). Paul A. David and Peter Solar, "A
Bicentenary Contribution to the History of the Cost of Living in America,"
Research in Economic History, ed. Paul Uselding, vol. 2 (Greenwich, Cpnn:
JAI Press Inc., 1977), p. 16. Columns (5) and (6). Thomas Senior.Berry,
Production and Population Since 1879 Revised GNP Series in Constant Dollars,
(Richmond VA: The Bostwick Press, 1988), pp. 21, 19.
8The effect on both the monetary base and the stock of money were
dramatic by antebellum standards.4 Between 1848 and 1856 the monetary base
was multiplied by a factor of 2.04 and the stock of money was multipied by a
factor of 2.22. Today, of course, many countries experience monetary growth
of this magnitude as a matter of course. Increases of nearly this magnitude
in the U.S. have come to be seen in the 1980s as a tight money policy. It is
a measure of the success of the metallic standards of the nineteenth century
that increases in the quantity of the monetary metal resulting from the
discovery of unbelievably rich mines resulted in a growth rate of the
monetary base considered rather conservative in recent years.
This increase in the stock of money produced, as the quantity theory of
money predicts, an increase in nominal income and prices. Indeed, the
cyclical expansion, which the NBER dates from 1848 to 1854, is the longest
on record from 1834 (when the table I am following begins) until World War
II. The coincidence of this long and inflationary expansion with a large
increase in the stock of money cannot be attributed to channels of causation
4The money supply figures shown in the text are the sum of Friedman and
Schwartz's (1970, pp. 222-225) estimates of specie held by the public,
banknotes held by the public, and adjusted deposits. This is the same as
estimates by George Macesich (Friedman and Schwartz, 1970, p. 231-232) in
each year except 1850 when there is a modest 5 percent difference. There are
also money supply estimates made by Peter Temin (Friedman and Schwartz,
1970, p. 231-232) on a slightly different basis, but for broad comparisons
the differences are not important.
5The NBER chronology shows an economic expansion lasting five years
from 1848 to 1853. (Moore, 1980, p. 152) There was a recession in 1853 to
1855, followed by an expansion from 1855 to 1856. In the text I have
generally given rates of change from the trough in 1848 to the peak in 1856
for two reasons. (1) The recession appears to have been mild, and does not
show up in the real income data. (2) Taking rates of growth to the second
cyclical peak allows for a lagged affect of money on prices.
9running from the rise in income to the stock of money since the increasein
the monetary base resulted from chance discoveries of major goldfields in
California and eastern Austalia. This episode is a good example of a natural
experiment well structured to test the quantity theory of money.
The surprising thing is that a monetary shock of this magnitude
apparently produced a mild increase in the price level. One of the available
wholesale price index does increase by a factor of about 1.39 between 1848
and 1856, corresponding to an annual growth rate of 4.09 percent per year.
But the GNP deflator shown in column 4 was multiplied by a factor of only
1.25, an annual growth of 2.82 percent. And a modern estimate of the
consumer price index shown in column 3 of Table 1 reveals hardly any effect
at all until 1854. Between 1848 and 1856 the consumer price index increased
by a factor of only 1.07.6
International adjustments played some role in inhibiting price
increases. The flow of gold into bimetallic France during this period
produced an outflow of silver to India and the Far East, the so-called
golden parachute. And as predicted by the Humean-Price-Specie-Flow
Mechanism, the balance of international payments turned against the U. S. By
one measure (Berry 1988, p. 26) the net export position of the U.S. changed
from a surplus of 7 million in 1848 to a maximum deficit of 45 million in
6As my critics pointed out when I presented the first version of the
paper in London, the data may be unreliable. There has been a good deal of
work done on wholesale price indexes in the antebellum period, but the
resulting numbers undoubtedly have a wide margin of error. Broader
measures such as the consumer price index probably have a wider margin of
•error. A perusal of the prices of individual commodities naturally shows a
wide range of changes, with a tendency for prices of internationally traded
commodities to increase faster than prices of domestically traded goods. The
price of wheat, for example, rose 5.02 percent per year from 1848 to 1856
and the price of bricks 1.55 percent per year. The conclusions in the text,
then, must be considered tentative until more reliable data becomes available.
101853, the deficit then declined to 14 million in 1856. But international
competition cannot explain why real money balances in the United States rose
dramatically, and remained high despite a long period for adjustment.
If price increases had been held downinthe rest of the world, by
whatever mechanism, and the demand for money had been stable in the U. S.
the U.S. would have run even larger balance of payments deficits, and lost
even more of the new gold. Instead the U.S. made very large additions to its
stock of real cash balances. Or to put it differently, international price
competition can not explain why monetary velocity in the U.S. fell at the
rate of 2.79 percent per year from 1848 to l856.
Velocity in the twentieth century tended to rise in cyclical
exapansions. In the nineteenth century, however, because of the long secular
decline, velocity tended to fall somewhat even in expansions.7 This
phenomenon has been examined in depth by Michael Bordo and Lars Jonung
(1987). They attribute the long-run decline in velocity, a phenomenon they
observe in a number of countries, to the spread of the money economy and the
development of commercial banking. The fall in velocity during the gold rush
boom, however, appears to have been larger than can be accounted for solely
by secular trends. For example, from 1833 (the beginning of Macesich's
monetary series) until 1859 velocity fell -.81percent per year. From 1820
(the beginning of Temin's money stock estimates) until 1859 velocity using
this measure of money fell at -.89percent per year. The acceleration of the
decline in velocity during the gold rush boom might, however, be due to an
7See the graphs in Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz (1969 pp. 128-
129).
11acceleration of the forces behind the long-run decline in velocity, a
possibility I will return to below.
4. Free Bankin2 and the Cold Rush
This paradox, a large monetry shock combined with a mild inflation, has
been neglected by monetary historians. There isn't sufficient space here for
a full investigation. It is appropriate, however, to ask whether the advent
of free banking had anything to do with the mildness of the inflation
generated by the gold discoveries. The reason for focussing on this issue is
that much of the current interest in. free banking stems, I believe, from the
hope that free banking can contribute to macroeconomic stability. Of course,
even if the only benefit from free banking was improved financial services
(lower loan rates, higher interest on deposits, service with a smile, and so
on) the gain would be worth pursuing. But it is the connection with monetary
policy that makes competition in banking potentially more interesting than
competition in other important industries.
Before examining the relationship between free banking and the
expansion in detail we want to know how much can be explained by the
traditional arguments in the demand for money function: interest rates and
real income. Table 2 shows several interest rate series. There is some
evidence of a downward trend. But it seems unlikely that declines of the
magnitude shown here could account for such large accumulations of cash
balances. The federal government bond rate, for example, falls about 160
basis points between 1848 and 1856, a fall of 23 percent, while real cash
balances rose 54 percent, so the demand for money would have to have been
unusually sensitive to interest rates to produce deccreases in velocity of
12this magnitude. The commercial paper rate does show a large decrease between
1848 and 1856, but the volatility of this series makes it unlikely that this
was representative of short tern rates. The rates derived from bank balance






















1847 5.77 9.59 3.48 5.65 n.a.
1848 5.71 15.10 3.99 •5.41 n.a.
1849 5.16 10.25 8.12 4.92 n.a.
.
1850 4.58 8.04 5.30 5.81 4.01
1851 4.47 9.66 4.94 5.59 7.85
1852 4.39 6.33 2.87 4.28 1.51
1853 4.02 10.25 6.20 4.05 4.97
1854 4.14 10.37 4.07 4.89 4.75
1855 4.18 8.92 2.80 4.20 4.75
1856 4.11 8.83 4.90 4.40 4.10
1857 4.30 11.56 4.73 3.99 3.24
1858 4.32 4.81 4.30 3.67 5.57
1859 4.72 6.14 4.68 4.18 3.26
Sources: columns (1) and (2). Sidney Homer, A History of Interest Rates (New
Brunswick N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1963), pp. 287, 318-9. Columns
(3), (4), and (5). Hugh Rockoff, "The Short-Term Capital Market Before the
Civil War: An Exploratory Inquiry," unpublished working paper (1988), pp.
12, 19, and 22. These were computed by dividing dividends plus change in
surplus by total earning assets. Realized yields can be low in a period of
financial stringency even though lending rates are high.
14Real per capita income grew .82 percent per year from 1848 to 1856.
This implies, when one works it through, that an income elasticity of 4.37
would be required to account for the decline in velocity, ignoring the
contribution of interest rates and other variables. But over the whole
period 1820 to 1859 an income elasticity of 1.70 could account for the
decline in velocity. The results of these "back of the envelope"
calculations are confirmed when demand for money functions are estimated.
Examples are presented below in conjunction with tests of other explanations
for the paradox.
One way increased competition might have contributed to stability was
by forcing banks to provide better services for depositors and noteholders,
thus increasing the demand for money. One piece of evidence for increased
competition is the increase in the number of banks. In Massachusetts the
number of banks increased from 112 in 1848 to 172 in 1856; in New York State
the increase was from 171 to 338; in Pennsylvania the increase was from 47
to 71; in Ohio the increase was from 48 to 65.8 All of these increases, and
those in many other states, were large by historical standards, although the
antebellum period in general was a period of rapid growth in the number of
banks. Bordo and Jonung (1987, pp. 81-82, and passim) cite growth in the
number of bank offices per capita as an institutional change leading to a
decline in velocity. So a prima facie case can be made that the introduction
of free banking cushioned the impact of the gold discoveries. In an earlier
draft of the paper I put considerable weight on this argument. But critics
8U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Report. 1876, pp. XCVIII,
CII, CIV, CXVI.
15of the argument have convinced me that the case is somewhat weaker than I
believed.
First of all free banking laws, ner se, cannot explain the vast
increase in the number of banks because only a fraction of all states
adopted them and some states that did adopt them incoporated costly
requirements that discouraged entry. For example, of the four states cited
above, only two New York and Ohio had free banking laws, and in Ohio
formation of the free banks was suspended for part of the period. This
point is related to one made recently by Kenneth Mg (1988). Mg shows that in
most cases (the exception was New York) the passage of a free banking law
did not lead to faster growth of bank assets in the free banking state than
the national or regional average.
But it may be that to look at the free banking law as the only vehicle
for providing increased competition in banking is to take too mechanical a
view of the process. Commercial freedom, indeed political freedom, was in
the air. Some states responded by passing a free banking law. Overall, 19
free banking laws were passed in the antebellum periodr 12 in the period
1848 to 1856. But thelegislatures in other states may have responded by
simply becoming more willing to charter additional banks, thus giving more
weight to the up-and-coming class of potential entrepreneurs rather than to
established interests. Richard Sylla (1985) argues that bank entry in New
9uugh Rockoff (1975, p. 3). This total includes two separate laws from
passed in Michigan.
16England was essentially free although it relied mostly on legislative
charters 10
The potential political interactions here are complex. Greater
willingness to charter banks in some cases, may have been a way of
undermining pressures for a formal free banking law. In other cases, the
intent of free banking could be undermined by including various restrictions
in the free banking law.
George Green's (1972, pp. 130-135) discussion of the origins and
structure of Louisiana's free banking law shows just how complex the
political context could be. The State Constitution of 1845 and the general
incoporation law of 1848 prohibited the chartering of new banks, reflecting
democratic hard money sentiments. But attitudes changed quickly spurred in
part, perhaps, by the high profits said to be earned by the New Orleans
banks, protected as they were by an absolute prohibition on competition. A
constitutional convention in 1852 permitted the legislature to charter banks
one by one or enact a free banking law. In 1853, a free banking law was
passed, but it contained a requirement of a one-third reserve against
deposits. This requirement followed an older Louisiana tradition rather than
the free banking model of the North. Given the restrictiveness of the actual
legislation it is not surprising that Bank assets in Louisianna did not grow
faster than in surrounding states. But the reversal of the state of opinion
between 1845 and 1852 is a sign of how strong political pressures for easing
bank entry requirements had become.
10An exception is the attempt by the New England country banks to
obtain a charter for a bank in Boston to compete with the Suffolk (the bank
that redeemed country banknotes). This effort was frustrated until a charter
was finally obtained for the Bank o.f Mutual Redemption in 1857.
17Even if we can see our way around the problem raised by Ng there are
still a number of problems facing the argument that increased competition in
banking explains the fall in velocity. (1) A greater number of banks would
reduce the time required to get to the bank, but this "shoe-leather" cost,
while it might explain the increase in balances held in the frontier areas
does not seem sufficient, intutitively, to explain the equally great rise in
real balances in the eastern financial centers. (2) Another possibility is
that explicit payment of interest on deposit accounts may have increased.
But at least in Massachusetts, one of the few states for which we have data,
the ratio of interest bearing deposits to total deposits actually fell
during this period, continuing a long term trend. (3) Finally, the number of
banks is not significant in regressions explaining the demand for money,
when other variables such as interest rates and real income are included.
How then can we explain the broad correspondence between the increase
in the number of banks and the increase in real money balances? A line of
causation may have run from the growth in real cash balances to the growth
in the number of banks. With the demand for banking services on the rise,
legislatures may have been swamped with applications for new charters. Some
legislatures may have met this problem by adopting free banking laws while
others simply responded to the challenge by rapidly chartering new banks.
Just as a rise in the demand for wheat would produce a rise in the number of
farms, the rise in the demand for real balances would produce a rise in the
number of banks. This point can be confirmed econometrically. Lagged values
of real money balances are more highly correlated with the current number of
banks than are lagged banks with current real money balances.
18Finally, it appears that there are other potential explanations for the
mildness of the inflation. One possibility that I have explored in a
preliminary way turns on the rapid increase in asset prices triggered by the
gold rush. Rising asset prices can be expected to increase the demand for
money in several ways, two of which seem relevant here. (1) Rising asset
prices represent an increase in wealth. (2) Rising asset prices are normally
accompanied by an increased volume of transactions on financial markets. It
seems beyond question that there was a substantial boom on asset markets,
and that it was nationwide. In the East, particularly in New York, the
speculative spirit was manifested in financial markets. In the West land
prices rose; in the South, the price of slaves. linfortuneately, there is no
comprehensive index of asset prices or quantities that would permit a
decisive test of this explanation. Table 3, however, presents two
representative regressions based on an index of stock prices.
Another possibility is that monetization of the economy increased
during this period. It has been said, for example, that in Indiana
production by farmers of goods for the home (as opposed to the market) fell
by one half during the iBSOs. (Esarey, 1947, p. 100). This is one of the
factors stressed by Bordo and Jonung (1987), and a variable to account for
this factor is also included in table 3.
See Friedman (1988) for a full analysis.
19Table 3
Estimates of the Demand for Money, 1820-1858
Dependent Varaible: Logarithm of Real Per Capita Money Balancesa
1821 -1858 1834-1858
Indepen. Variables Coeff. Absolute tCoeff.Absolute t
Constant -3.18 3.04 -2.74 1.57
Long interest rateb .02 .03 -- - -
Shortinterest rateC -- -- - .13 2.14
Real per capita incomed .97 3.36 .63 1.49
specie-money ratioe -.08 2.05 -.11 1.77
Real stock prices .17 1.84 .17 1.96
Gold rushg .14 2.24 .09 1.25
Lagged money .43 2.88 .68 3.48
Adj. R2 .90 .83
S.E. Regression .10 .09
aNatural logarithm of per capita money balances divided by the GNP deflator.
See Table 1 for sources.
bNatural logarithm of the New England Municipal Bond Rate from Homer (1963,
pp. 286-287).
CNatural logarithm of the comerccial paper rate from Homer (1963, pp. 318-
319).
dNatural logarithm of per capita GN? in 1860 dollars. See Table 1 for
sources.
eNatural logarithm of the ratio of currency in the form of specie to money
from Temin (1969, pp. 71, 159).
Natura1 logarithm of an index of stock prices divided by the GNP deflator.
Three stock price series from Smith and Cole (1935) were linked. The June
value of their index of Bank and Insurance Stock Prices from 1820 to 1833
(p. 174), the June value of their Index of Railroad Stock Prices from 1834
to 1845 (p. 183), and their index of Railroad Stock prices from 1845 to 1858
(p. 184). The average ratio of the series in the available overlapping years
was used to link them.
g dummyvariablethat takes the value 1 in the years 1850-1856.
20The dependent variable in each case is the natural logarithm of real
percapita money balances. Each equation contains six explanatory variables
(all taken in logarithms) besides a constant term. (I) An interest rate. A
long term bond rate is used in the first equation, the commercial paper rate
(available for only the shorter period) in the second. (2) Real per capita
income. (3) The ratio of money held as specie to the total money supply.
This variable, suggested by the work of Bordo and Jonung (1987), was
included to account for the gradual monetization of the economy. Their
argument is that as people become more sophisticated in the use of money
they switch from currency to deposits, and hold larger real balances, In our
context this implies a negative coefficient. (4) Real stock prices. In the
second equation these are railroad stock prices divided by the GNP deflator.
To get a long-term index I linked in an index of bank and insurance stocks
for the pre-1834 period. This is not as farfetched as it might at first
appear since in each period the index then reflects the dominant stocks in a
narrow market. But a more representative index would be useful. Some of the
potential problems in using this data are discussed in Schwert (1989). (5) A
dummy variable (gold rush) that takes the value one in the years 1850
through 1856. The purpose of this variable is to test whether these years
still appear special after other factors are taken into account. (6) The
lagged value of the dependent variable. This variable, a common one in
demand for money studies, allows for the gradual adjustment of desired to
actual real balances.
Most of the variables were signed as predicted and were statistically
significant. This was generally true in a wide range of similar regressions
designed to test alternative specifications. There is some evidence of
21serial correlation in the residuals, but at least the Cochrane-Orcut
adjustment left the results similar, if anything a bit stronger. In
particular, the specie-money ratio designed to capture the increasing
monetization of the economy had the expected negative sign confirming the
results obtained by Bordo and Jonung (1987) for a large sample of countries.
And the stock market variable had the expected positive sign confirming a
result obtained by Friedman (1988) with much more recent data. But despite
taking these factors into account the gold rush variable is still
significant. Real money balances, in other words, still appear unusually
high in these years.
But I read these regressions as saying that variables other than the
introduction of free banking may be able to account for the rise in real
balances in the gold rush expansion. In particular the gold rush dummy falls
in size and significance in the second equation, when a better proxy for
short-term interest rates is available, although the sample is then
extremely small, With better measures of the rise in asset prices, and a
better way of allowing for the slow adjustment to the increase in money
supplies produced by the gold rush, the residual to be explained by free
banking might prove even smaller.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the free banking explanation for
the mildness of the inflation depends not on the existence of competition,
but rather on the introduction of competition offsetting the increase in the
monetary base. Had deregulation of the system occurred earlier so that the
effects had worked out of the system by 1848, the gold rush boom on this
argument might have had more repercusions on prices or the balance of
payments.
22To sun up, although the introduction of free banking occurred during a
period in which a major monetary shock was absorbed with apparent ease, this
may have been fortuitous. The evidence suggests that at most free banking
deserves only a limited share of the credit.
5. A ComDarison of 1848-1856 with 1981-1989.
Whatever the role future research ultimately assigns to deregulation of
banking, monetization of the economy, asset price changes, and so on in the
explanation of the decline in velocity, it seems useful here to compare the
gold rush boom with another period in which people have examined similar
factors in an effort to explain the ability of the economy to absorb
unusually large increases in the stock of money: the current prolonged
expansion in the U.S. This comparison is made in Table 4.
Table 4
A Comparison of the Period 1848-1856 with 1981-1988
(Annualized Growth Rates)
Variable 1848-1856 1981-1988
Money CM2) 9.97 7.41
(Ml) -- 8.14
GNP Deflator 2.82 3.69
Real GNP 4.36 2.96
Velocity (1(2) -2.78 -.76
(Ml) ,- -1.49
23Consumer Prices .89 3.73
Producer Prices (Ag.)4.74 1.36
Producer Prices (hid.) 4.99 1.26
Sources. 1848-1856: Table 1, and for producer prices,
Smith and Cole, 1935, p. 168. 1981-88: U.S. Econonic
ReDort of the President. 1989, pp. 385, 312, 310, 308,
373, and 382. 1988 figures were the June observation
when monthly data was given or the average of the second
and third quarters.
24The growth of nominal CNP was rapid in both expansions, but it was
divided slightly differently between real and nominal changes. Inflation was
about nine tenths of one percent higher and real GNP growth about one and
four tenths percent lower in the modern period. The increase in the stock of
money was faster in the earlier episode (more so if we compare the
antebellum money stock with modern 142). And partly on that account the
decline in velocity was greater. If we move from the CNP deflator to less
comprehensive indexes we see an interesting reversal. In the earlier period
consumer prices appear to have risen less than producer prices; in the
modern period consumer prices rose faster than producer prices. The
explanation in both periods may lie in the rate of inflation in
international markets since producer prices tend to follow this trend more
closely than more comprehensive indexes.
Perhaps the main lesson of this comparison is that over periods as
short as one-half business cycle, the relationships among money, prices and
real income are subject to considerable variation. The gold rush did produce
an increase in prices and real output. But it did not produce as much
inflation, or as severe a balance of payments deficit, as might have been
expected. But this appears to have been a somewhat fortuitous due (perhaps)
to the acceleration of the long term process of monetization or to the
revaluation of assets triggered by the economic expansion. Free banking, øer
se, probably deserves only a small part of the credit for the relatively
favorable outcome of a potentially inflationary monetary shockJ2
12To the extent that the Crisis of 1857 can be linked to theexpansion
(I ant not convinced that it can be) the favorable impression created by
looking primarily at the period 1848 to 1856 is misleading.
25In a similar way, the current expansion does not appear to have
produced as much inflation as might have been anticipated, particularlyby
an analyst inclined to focus on Ml. These deviations fromtrend should be
regarded as spurs to further research rather than reasonsfor abandoning
monetary analysis.
6. A Bimetallic Standard
The monetary standard during the free banking era was not a
monometallic gold standard, but rather a bimetallic standard. The mint stood
ready to coin silver into legal tender dollars. But due first tothe mint
ratios set in 1834 that were favorable to gold, and second to the vast
increase in the production of gold, there was very little silver money
actually in circulation in the l840s and l8SOs. Many midwestern bankers, it
was said, had never seen silver coins, except for those brought in by German
immigrants. Nevertheless, the votential availability of a second monetary
metal was an important safeguard of price level stability. It is the
existence of this safeguard that makes it appropriate to refer to the
antebellum system as a bimetallic system.
To illustrate this point suppose (1) that the U.S. had been on a
inonometallic gold standard in the 1850s instead of a bimetallic standard,
and (2) that gold had not been found in California and Australia. Could the
existing supply of gold have maintained a stable price level, or would the
economy have been forced to undergo the sort of deflation, with all of its
disruptive political and social consequences, that occurred in the U.S. from
1873 to 1896 (when insufficient supplies of gold were forthcoming)?
26If real income and velocity had changed from 1848 to 1856 at the rates
they actually changed (4.36 percent and -2.79 percent) then an increase in
the stock of money of 7.15 percent per year would have been necessary to
maintain price level stability. While money growth exceeded exceeded this
rate in the expansion that followed the depression of the early 1830s, over
the longer run it did not. Macesich's money series begins in 1833. From
1833 to 1848 the stock of money rose only 3.55 percent per year. To see what
a continuation of this rate would have meant, apply it to the growth in the
demand for money of 7.15 percent per year that actually prevailed over the
period 1848 to 1856. The difference implies a deflation of 3.60 percent per
year. In other words, had the economy truly been on a gold only standard
and had no new sources of gold been discovered, the resulting deflation
would have been fairly severe. By way of contrast, from 1879 when the U.S.
returned to the gold standard and 1896 when opposition to the gold standard
peaked in the U.S. with the nomination of free silver candidate Wiliam
Jennings Bryan for president by the Democrats, the decline in the GNP
deflator was about 1.5 percent per year and the decline in the consumer
price index was about 1.1 percent per year.
Obviously, these calculations do not allow for the myriad of factors
that would have impinged on the relationship between money and prices under
the twin hypothetical assumptions of a monometallic gold standard and no new
gold discoveries. To the extent, for example, that the fall in velocity
during the period 1848 to 1856 was caused by the revaluation of assets
produced by the monetary expansion, the example uverstates the decline in
'prices that would have occurred under the twin assumptions of a monometallic
27gold standard and no gold rush. But the calculations do illustrate that
there was a potential for a disturbing deflation.
Now replace assumption (1) with the actual antebellum arrangement.
Under the bimetallic system deflationary pressures generated by stagnant
gold supplies would have encouraged producers of silver and owners of
existing stocks of silver to bring their silver to the mint (since there was
unlimited demand for silver at the mint price) and increased supplies of
silver base money would have mitigated the fall in prices.
Against this undeniable benefit of a bimetallic system it is often
argued that the alternating replacements of one metal by another are a major
cost of a bimetallic system. The point is sometimes made by saying that a
"true" bimetallic standard (according to this definition one in which both
metals circulate side by side) is unlikely to exist for very long and that
the most likely outcome is an alteration of gold and silver standards. But
this argument places too much weight, I believe, on the day to day
functioning of the system and too little on the macroeconomic properties of
the system. True, gold coins may be somewhat lighter, and to some people
more attractive, so that a rapid replacement of gold by silver would cause
some transactional and psychological costs. (The replacement of silver by
gold is usually welcomed). But it is hard to see how costs derived from
these preferences could be the source of major economic costs from society's
point of view. During World War II in the U.S. (to take an extreme case)
copper cents were replaced by steel cents in one year, and for several
years the nickel was removed from the "nickel" (the American S cent piece).
These were matters of interest primarily to numistmatists.
28There is no guarantee, of course, that a bimetallic standard will
produce a smoother increase in the monetary base than a gold only or silver
only standard. But the logic of not putting all one's eggs in one basket,
•and the American experience from 1873 to 1896, suggest that a bimetallic
standard is to be preferred to a monometallic standard if a choice must be
made between the two.
7. The Need for a Lender of Last Resort
There was no lender of last resort during the free banking era.
Indeed, the U.S. had no clear lender of last resort during the period from
the fall of the Second Bank of the U.S. until the Federal Reserve was
established in 1913. One could make the case, however, that the response of
the system to the crisis of 1857 (the major crisis in the period) is
particularly informative. By the latter part of the postbellum period, the
large New York banks had attained such a major position within the financial
system that one could argue that at times, particularly under the leadership
of J.P. Morgan, they sometimes acted as lenders of last resort. During the
free banking era, moreover, banking legislation varied so much from state to
state (since there was no national banking system) that this epsiode can
shed considerable light on the type of system most likely to survive a
banking panic in the absence of a lender of last resort.
It was in many respects a classic crisis. Although there had been
difficulties in 1854, the crisis of 1857 seems to have come as almost a
complete shock to tte market. The spark was the failure of the Ohio Life
Insurance and Trust Company. Based in Ohio this bank had a reputation for
soundness, but its New York agent had speculated heavily in railroad bonds.
29Here is how Hugh McCulloch president of the Bank of the State of Indiana
remembered the crisis.
It came without premonition; it was a financial sirocco
which at once dried up the springs of confidence and
faith. Those who had money held it with the grip of
misers. Trust ceased; confidence between men, confidence
in everything but money, and hard money at that,
disappeared. Men who were worth millions could not
raise the few thousands that were needed to save them
from discredit. Distrust, as general as it was
causeless, pervaded the country. (Mcculloch, 1889, p.
133).
Given the violence of the crisis, it is not surprising that a
suspension of specie payments took hold in New York and quickly spread
through the rest of the country. A few banks and banking systems, however,
managed to hold out against the general suspension. In New York the Chemical
Bank, alone, continued to redeem its notes. Among banking systems, only the
Bank of the State of Indiana, the State Bank of Ohio, the banks of Kentucky,
New Orleans, and Charleston (as far as I have been able to learn) continued
to redeem in specie.
The systems of free banking in New York, or chartered banking in New
England, were not able to survive the crisis unscathed. The interesting
thing here is that three of the western systems escaped suspension, despite
the origin of the panic in the failure of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust
Company, and the general reputation of the west for free and easy banking.
Whatthesethree groups of banks had in common was that they were, to an
extent, branch banking systems. They were not branches in the modern sense,
but rather more like federations of banks. Each branch was in many ways an
independent bank, but there was a board to oversee the overall operation of
the banks, and each branch was in some degree reponsible for the liabilities
of the other branches.
-
30Bray Hammond (1957, p. 712) argues that it was the small number of
banks in these states that allowed them to "act in concert" and avoid the
crisis. But he does not define exactly what actions they took in concert
that banks in the east could not. It is unclear, for example, whether there
was any actual transfer of specie among branches in the three western
systems during the crisis. Hugh Mcculloch's (1889, pp. 134 -35)description
of his monitoring of the demands on the banches of the Bank of the State of
Indiana in the crisis suggests that no actual transfers were made, although
he had this eventuality in mind. More likely, it was the potential
reinforcements from other branches (both in the short and long runs) that
reassured noteholders and so modified the demands on the bank. The
participation of the state government in the Ohio and Kentucky systems may
also have reassured depositors and noteholders.
It should be noted, however, that there were some special circumstances
at work here. The Bank of the State of Indiana had just com.xnenced operations
in January of 1857; when the crisis hit in August.13 So. the Bank may not
have been fully loaned up.14 It was also true that the Bank of the State of
Indiana was legally bound to give up its charter if it suspended payments.
Under ordinary circumstances it might have expected legislative relief from
this provision in the event of a nationwide financial crisis, But the
13The Bank of the State of Indiana was an entirely private successor to
the State Bank of Indiana, a similar, but partially state owned institution
then in the process of being wound up. The State Bank of Indiana had in 1840
surmounted a general suspension affecting the South and West. Specie
payments were not made uniformly, but most demands were arranged in some
fashion. (Harding, 1895, p. 18).
14The Bank of the State of Indiana took over the business of the State
Bank of Indiana. But the managers of the State Bank had not foreseen that
there would be a successor and had begun to wind up its affairs.
31political circumstances in Indiana were such that the Bank of the State
could not count on this possibility. In other words, in other states
suspending redemption was a way of preserving the long run value of a bank
charter, but not in Indiana.
In addition, McCulloch denigrates the performance of the Kentucky banks
on the grounds that many of the notes were issued by branches that were not
easily accessible, and of the State Bank of Ohio on the grounds that the
Ohio note brokers considered the branches of the State Bank to be so
weakened by the failure of the Ohio Life and Insurance Company that the
brokers did not bother to make a run on them. (McCulloch, 1889, pp. 133-
134.) Although, McCulloch's desire to cast the performance of his own bank
in the most favorable light is obvious, it is nevertheless true that he was
well informed and generally reliable. Clearly, it would be. useful to know
more about how and why the western systems escaped the general panic.
There was an example of cooperation in New Orleans when one of the
chartered banks (as distinct from the free banks) was bailed out by the
other chartered banks at the governor's request. But Green (1972, p. 162)
concludes that the major factor may be simply that the crisis hit at a
moment when the banks were unusually strong. The high (one-third) legal
reserve ratio against deposits for the free banks and the one third ratio
against notes and deposits for the chartered banks may also have played a
role. Overall, according to Hammond (1957, p. 716), New Orleans led the
nation with a 52.46 percent reserve ratio against notes and deposits.
The experience of the western branch systems in 1857, despite the
reservations, help to strengthen a point made by Friedman and Schwartz
(1963, pp. 352, 457-8) following work by George Morrison, and recently
32expanded upon by Eugene White (1984, pp. 131-2) based on a comparison of the
U.S. and Canada during the Great Depression. Canada, with a small number of
banks but many branches, suffered no failures during the Depression; but the
U.S. with many small independent banks, suffered thousands. It would seem to
follow that permitting branch banking may be an effective way of reducing
the chance of a financial panic.1-5
These experiences do not say, however, that branching systems will be
better in all circumstances. For example, one could imagine in our current
political climate that a large financial center bank could be forced by
political pressures to keep uneconomic branches in the'hinterlands open,
thus weakening the bank as a whole, and increasing the probability of a
major failure.
Moreover, while it is true that the experience during the crisis of
1857 suggests that there were banking structures likely to be resistant to
panic, it is hard to make the case that a widespread branching could reduce
the probability of a panic to zero. There still appears to be some
irreducible minimum of risk inherent in a fractional reserve banking system.
A central bank acting as lender of last resort may be the only politically
feasible institutional arrangement for elminating this risk.16 It is useful,
however, to turn the question around and ask whether we should build into
the banking system additional mechanisms such as branch banking for
minimizing the risk of and damage from financialcrises. The answer is
t5Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 353), however, argue that as
paradoxical as it may seem high rates of bank failure (given the decline in
the stock of money) may actually have been better for the U.S. because it
encouraged people to spend money rather than hoard it.
16See Coodhart (1988) for a development of this point using a wide
range of historical evidence.
33clearly yes. A central bank may fail to act as lender of last resort (as the
Federal Reserve system did in the nineteen thirties) for a variety of
reasons. Under a specie standard, for example, a central bank might be
paralyzed by a lack of specie, or by the fear that a reduction of its specie
reserves would add to the panic.
8. A Bank Issued Currency
In the free banking era private banks rather than the government issued
the hand to hand currency. There were, it must be admitted, numerous
complaints that the lack of a uniform currency was an inconvenience for the
public. Instead of accepting a dollar in almost perfect certainty that it is
legal tender as we do, people in those days had to accept a risk that the
money they took might turn out bad. In practice, things were not as
disorganized as a reading of some descriptions of the period suggests.
Normally, merchants and their customers dealt with notes issued by local
banks they knew well. When dealing with unfamiliar notes a merchant might
have to use a banknote reporter, a publication that listed the value of
notes, or a counterfeit detector. But the process for him was not that
different than a modern merchant checking a credit card number, or worrying
about the value of a check being offered.
But were there advantages to a bank issued currency to offset the lack
of uniformity? One advantage when notes were issued on general bank assets
(as in New England) is that the seignorage from note issue would be invested
by private bankers, perhaps more wisely, than when it is spent by the
government. The free banking law, however, by requiring banks to back notes
34with government bonds returned part of the seignorage to the government in
the form of higher bond prices.
A more technical advantage of a bank issued currency is that banks can
then accomodate changes in the public's desired ratio of currency to
deposits without there having to be a change in the stock of money. Under
the present system an increase in the desired ratio of currency to deposits
will lead to a withdrawal of currency from the banking system, and a
decrease in the stock of money, since currency is high-powered money.
This point can be put more formally as follows)-7
Let
—specie(gold and silver coins) held by the public
Sb —specieheld by banks
N1, —notesheld by the public
Nb —notesheld by the banks
D —depositsheld by the public
14 —thestock of money
B the monetary base
s —theratio of specie to money desired by the public
n —theratio of notes to money desired by the public
rn —thereserve ratio of the banks against notes
rd athereserve ratio of the banks against deposits
The stock of money can then be defined as
(1) 14 —5 + N1,+D
17Friedman and Schwartz (1963, Appendix B, pp. 776-798) present a
general disscussion of this approach. The same point has been made in
somewhat different terms by White (1984, pp. 9-14), and Selgin (1987, p.
114), who concentrate on a note supply, rather than money supply model.
35and the monetary base as
(2) B —5 + Sb
Equation (2) has been specialized for the free banking era. Notes are
assumed to be issued by banks, only specie is treated as part of the
monetary base.
With a little bit of manipulation we can set up the following identity.
(3) M —B*(l/(n*(rn
-rd)+ra*(ls)+s))
This equation can be viewed as a money supply function showing how the money
supply varies depending on the monetary base (which varies with the output
of the mines and the balance of payments), the preferences of the public for
notes and specie, and the preferences of the banks for reserves. The key
point here is the term n*(rn -rd).Variations in the proportion of their
total money balances the public wishes to hold in the form of notes (holding
constant the proportion they desire to hold as specie) affect the stock of
money only to the extent there is a difference between the reserve ratios
against notes and deposits. If the two reserve ratios are equal, changes in
the desired proportion of notes have no effect on the stock of money.
It is important to remember, however, that this is not protection
against runs on banks during a financial crisis. In that case what people
would want is not notes, but hard money. If the ratio s rises in equation
(3) then the stock of mould fall)8
-8There are some reasons -why the public might want to convert from
deposits to notes in a cris-is. For example, noteholders were preferred
creditors in some cases, so depositors might want to convert in order to get
a higher place in the bankruptcy line. In the free banking states the bond
backing for notes, and the fact-that the bonds were held by state
authorities made notes more attractive in a panic. These factors may explain
the increase in note holding during the crisis of 1857.
36We can contrast this system with one in which notes are highpowered
money issued by the government. Redefine the monetary base as
(2') B —S,
+Sb+Nb+
Ifwe also redefine the reserve ratios of the banks to include notes we have
the following equation for the stock of money.
(3') M —B*(1/(n*(1
-rd)+rd*(ls)+s))
The only difference in the two money supply equations is in the n*(1 -rd)
term. Now, since notes are base money, increases in the note-to-money have a
depressing affect on the stock of money.
But how large were these effects in practice? If we take the time
derivative of equation (3') allowing money and the note issue to vary while
holding other variables constant, omit the subscript on r, and rearrange
terms we get
(4) K' —-n'(n(l-r)/[n(l-r)+r(l-s)+si)
wherethe apostrophe after a variable refers to the time rate of change
(growth rate) of the variable. Equation (4) is an upper bound estimate of
the fluctuations in the money stock avoided because notes were issued by
banks.
Overtheyears 1847 to 1859 the standard deviation of year to year
percentage changes in the note to money ratio was 7.54 percent. The standard
deviation of year to year percentage change in the term full term -n' (n(l-
r)/[n(1-r) +r(1-s)+SI)was 2.43 percent. Perhaps not a major gain, but
not negligible either. This figure might be contrasted with the standard
deviation of the year to year percentage change in the stock of money of
9.64 percent. So, on this crude calculation, fluctuations in the stock of
money were reduced-by perhaps 20 percent from what they wouldhave been. As
37equation (4) makes clear this advantage of free bankingshrinks as n, the
proportion of notes in the money stock, shrinks. Today,with this ratio less
than 7 percent this effect is not of great moment.
Perhaps the most compelling reason for allowing banks to issue currency
is that it would encourage innovation in the supply of currency. One reason
for the acceptance of a government monopoly of the note issue is the
implicit assumption that innovation is not possible. The government,
obviously, can print pieces of paper as easily as banks can. Given the
printing technology available at a point in time it would seemthat any
differences in the cost of production or technical quality between a bank
issued currency and a government issued currency would be small. But given
the fast pace of innovation in communications in general, the assumption
that innovation in the issue of currency is unlikely may no longer be
correct. Bank debit cards are but one example of the type of innovation that
would be more likely in a private regime.
9. Wildcat Banking
Wildcat banking was the most romantic aspect of the American experience
with free banking, and also the least understood. What was a wildcat bank?
Perhaps the best way of explaining is by quoting an account of an encounter
with a wildcat bank.
The story is told of the hunt by an Adams Co. [an
express company] agent for the Bank of Morocco. With a
thousand dollars in Morocco bills, the man traveled
through half of Indiana without discovering anyone who
had heard of the bank. Late one afternoon he came upon
twoisolatedlog cabins on a backwoods road. One was a
38blacksmith's shop; the other was the smith's house. The
smith admitted that he was the proprietor of the Bank of
Morocco, that the Bank itself was his potato barrel. He
paid off the notes with gold concealed in the barrel,
but begged the agent to keep the location of the bank a
company secret. If the whereabouts of the Bank of
Morocco became known, he pleaded, a general presentation
of its outstanding notes would ruin him. (Schultz and
Craine, 1937, p. 248).
There are two aspects of this story worth noting.(1) This was
something that happened under Indiana's free banking law. Bad banking, of
course, could happen under chartered banking as well. But it was likely to
be of a different form, cronyism would play a role, and the banker who got a
charter would more likely be an established businessman and politician
rather than the local blacksmith.(2) It was a frontier phenomenon. The
chance of this happening in a more developed region with better means of
communication, and more sophisticated bankers and noteholders was small.
But given the bond security function how could this happen at all? The
crucial variable was the number of notes a potential banker could issue for
a given dollar in bonds deposited. There are two cases to consider. (1) Th
nominal value of notes that could be issued exceeds the value of the bonds
deposited. In this very simple case there is an obvious incentive to set up
a wildcat bank. All one has to do is deposit some bonds, issue the notes and
pocket the difference. There is no reason the process has to stop after one
round. Suppose a banker could issue $100 on the basis of $90 in notes. Then
the wildcatter could deposit $90 worth of bonds, issue a $100 worth of
notes, use those notes to purchase $90 worth of bonds and $10 worth of gold,
deposit an additional $90 worth of bonds, issue a hundred dollars more in
39notes and so on and on. Hopefully, he would be outof town when someone
finally came to redeem theirnotes)-9
Now of course there are a number of problems with this game.First of
all, banking regulations normally made the value of bonds tobe deposited
far exceed the value of notes issued. In a few cases, however, it appears
that state authorities did accept securities less in value than the notes
issued, for a variety of reasons generally having to do withthe insistence
by the state that its bonds be valued at par. A second problem was getting
someone to take the notes at par or at least at a sufficientlysmall
discount to make the game worthwhile. This was no mean feat. People were
naturally suspicious of unfamiliar private notes. Reportedly someof the
Indiana wildcats employed river boat gamblers on the Mississippi to
"launder" their notes. But even with techniques such as this it seems likely
that much of the wildcat money never entered circulation or did so only at
very high discounts.
Although this model has been thought of as the only possible way that
wildcat banking could work in fact there is a second case. (2) The value of
the bonds deDosited exceeds the value of notes issued, but by a very small
margin. Here the trick is to use the notes to leverage the purchase of a
large mass of bonds, an4 to profit from the interest.
10. The Extent of Wildcat Bankina
1-9The wildcat banker could not simply sell his bonds when the volume of
note redemptions exceeded his specie reserve. Remember that the bonds were
in the hands of the state banking authority. They would be returned only
when the notes were returned, and the notes could be gathered up only by
repurchasing them from the public. On particular occasions, of course, the
bank might see a favorable chance for arbitrage, purchasing its ownnotesat
a discount and using them to redeem its bonds.
40All recent studies of wildcat banking includingmy owti (1971, 1974)
have emphasized that it was a rare phenomenon. However, a number of recent
studies, by Arthur Rolnick and Warren Weber (1983, 1984, 1988) and one by
Andrew 3. Economopoulos (1988) have, I believe, gone overboard in their
attempt to show that wildcat banking was not a problem.
Rolnick and Weber (1984) attempted to show that even in states that
suffered from very high rates of bank failure this could not have been due
to wildcat banking. They contrasted a theory that most failures were caused
by wildcat banking (a theory they attributed to me) with a theory that the
failures were caused by a decline in the value of assets held by banks
produced by shocks independent of the banking system. And they offered
evidence which they claimed showed that it was the decline in asset values
that produced high rates of bank failures rather than wildcat banking.
Although I appreciate being credited with a theory worthy of being
tested in an article in the Journal of Monetary Economics, I did not, in
fact, actually attempt to explain the overall failure rate under free
banking by reference to wildcat banking. I did try to analyze the phenomenon
of wildcat banking in the limited circumstances in which it occurred. But
it is clear that many free banks failed for the usual reasons: bad
management, bad times and financial crises, and so on. A physician can
spend a great deal of time studying cirrhosis of the liver without believing
that this disease is important in explaining a major part of the death rate.
But there is a more fundamental issue here, trying to compare a theory
that bank failures are caused by falling asset prices with a theory that
they were caused by wildcat banking is unsatifactory because it compares
different levels of analysis. Although the notion that falling asset prices
41cause bank failures is not strictly a tautology, it is hard to imagine a
case of massive bank failures in which falling asset prices did not play a
role. The interesting questions, typically, center on why asset prices fell
when they did, and what role administrative practices, legal restrictions,
regulatory agency behavior, and so on played in the process.
A reference to the Great Depression in the U.S. ,amore familiar case
to most economic historians, may clarify the point I am trying to make. We
could, of course, develop a theory that bank failures in the early l930s
were caused by falling asset prices of banks. And this theory could be
tested by correlating the value of assets held by banks with the number of
failures. Although I haven't performed the calculation, my assumption is
that such a theory would successfully "explain" the high rate of bank
faliure observed in the early l930s. We could also develop a theory that
bank failures were caused by the unwillingness of the Federal Reserve to act
as lender of last resort or of legislation that prohibited branch banking.
Obviously it wouldn't make sense to try to contrast the latter theories with
the falling asset theory. The latter two theories are attempts to go behind
the immediate failure and falling asset mix to get at the underlying causes.
All of these "theories" have a role to play in explaining the banking
situation of the early l930s.
Similarly, without denying that falling asset prices are going to be a
part of any process of massive free bank failures, we can certainly agree on
a number of ways in which wildcat banking laid the groundwork for the mix of
falling asset prices and bank failures examined by Rolnick and Weber. (1)
Wildcat banking in certain cases explains why there were banks there to fail
in the first place. In Indiana in 1853 numerous banks failed. Even if we
42accept Rolnick and Weber's point that the failures were caused by some
calamity affecting the value of assets held by the banks, we must still see
that the high failure rate depended on the large number of banks having been
set up in previous years. If the the smith in Indiana, referred to above,
had not planted the Bank of Morroco in his potato barrel, it would not have
failed when some independent shock hit the market for government bonds.
(2) The restriction of free banks to a limited set of bonds for backing
notes, and the tendency of wildcat bankers to do nothing but issue notes,
meant that the resulting banking system would have a limited portfolio and
would be extremely vulnerable to any factor affecting the price of the
particular asset held by the wildcat banks. Other sorts of banks, banks
that issued deposits as well as notes and that invested in local loans and
discounts, might have been able to weather a shock that was confined to the
class of securities backing the notes.
(3) Banks do not have to go out of business simply because their assets
(if sold off) are temporarily worth less than their liabilities. If a bank
has sufficient liquid assets to meet withdrawals it may stay in business for
years with the market value of assets less than the liabilites. All that is
required is that depositors, noteholders, and shareholders are confident
that the bank has an adequate cash flow to meet temporary withdrawals and
that it has some prospect of regaining profitability in the long run. If the
shock affecting its assets is expected to be temporary there is no reason to
go out of business. There may have been times in the past decade when some
of the largest banks in New York had insolvent balance sheets because of
heavy loans to Latin America. But that does not mean that it was accounting
43tricks that kept them in business. Depositors and shareholders assumed that
in the long run these instituions would return to prosperity.
Another way of putting this point is to say that banks normally have
some assets which are not (typically) shown on the books and which disappear
when the bank is liquidated: its "reputation," long-term relationships with
cutomers, the working relationships built up over the years among its top
managers, or other institution-specific forms of capital. If these assets
were properly valued it would be seen that total assets exceed total
liabilities and that there is a good reason for the market to pay a positive
price for the shares of the bank even though shareholders would receive
nothing if the bank was liquidated. It is these unieasured assets that made
the shares of large New York City banks valuable investments even when their
balance sheets were crowded with questionable loans to third world
countries. The wildcat banks, on the other hand, were merely shell
corporations created for the purpose of holding bonds and issuing notes.
They had no institution specific capital, so there was no reason for
creditors to permit them to stay in business when the market value of their
•assets was less than their liabilities. The explanation proposed by Rolnick
and tJeber, then, is not a truism that applies to all banks at all times. It
applies to wildcat banks precisely because they were dubious operations to
begin with.
The nature of the free banking law and wildcat banking can help explain
why the shock to asset prices caused so many banks to throw in the towel in
periods when bond prices were low and note redemptions were high. Part of
the problem was that, as we noted above, if a single note was protested then
the state banking authority was required to redeem all the notes of the
44bank. But to this must be added the problem that simply issuing notes was
raison detre of the wildcat banks. Since, to go back to our example, the
bank of Morroco had no other purpose than circlulating notes (it was not,
for example, collecting deposits or making local loans) there was no reason
for it to stay in business once the notes began to come back.(4) So far, I
have been following Rolnick and Weber in assuming that the fall in asset
prices is completely independent of anything going on in the banking system,
a completely independent shock. This, of course, will not normally be the
case. As banks are closed and their assets are sold, asset prices will fall.
This in turn will weaken the balance sheets of the remaining banks. Rather
than there being a simple line of causation running from asset prices to
bank failures, there is very likely to be an interactive pro&ess at work.
Indeed, one could even imagine cases where a collapse of the banking system
was anticipated, and reflected in asset prices before failures began in
earnest.
My point here is not to oppose Rolnick and Weber's story (exogenous
shock -fallingasset prices -bankfailures) with the exact opposite
(wildcat banking -bankfailures -fallingbank asset prices). Although I do
think that their failure to identify the nature of the shocks that affected
asset prices weakens their argument, it seems most likely that the
relationship between the collapse of some of the bond based free banking
systems and the value of the assets they held was a two way street. Falling
asset prices weakened the banks, and the dumping of bonds by failing banks
weakened the market for bonds.
In a more recent paper Rolnick and Weber (1988) examine the case of
Minnesota. This is one that I identified, following traditional accounts, as
45a case of wildcat banking. On the basis of newspaper accounts (which show
that there were plenty of warnings that the banks might be forced to suspend
specie payments) Rolnick and Weber reach the conclusion that what existed in
Minnesota was not wildcat banking, but rather a well-functioning market for
small denomination mutual fund securities. The idea is that once the bank
failed, the notes were worth whatever their bond backing was worth. People
saw through the whole process and bought the notes at a sufficient initial
discount to earn a competitive return when the notes were paid off. But
while there is considerable evidence that people were wary of the notes and
discounted them, it is a long leap from that evidence to the notion that
these were small denomination mutual fund securities.
To some extent it is a matter of semantics. Rolnick and Weber find
banks that were located away from Minneapolis to forestall redemption. They
find banks that only held bonds and did no local lending. They find banks
that were referred to as "bantlings" in the local press. I would call them
wildcat banks; Rolnick and Weber want to call them mutual funds issuing
small denomination securities. But Rolnick and Weber's terminology leads one
to think that there was a general market for these securities in the
antebellum period. Never, as far as I know, did anyone ever try to issue a
note which said "This is not a bank note and it is not redeemable in gold.
This is a claim to state government bonds and its value will vary depending
on the market value of the securities held at the time of redemption." To
my knowledge there was no law preventing the issue of such securities -laws
could be changed in any case -soit seems likely that there was no demand.
Rolnick and Weber have one example in the paper of how these notes
actually circulated.
46M.E. Ames, a St. Paul attorney, reported his experience
on April 11 and 16, 1859. He said he had received $200
of Owatonna notes from a 'respectable Banker of this
City'. (Ames did not say, however, what he paid for
these notes, so that it cannot be assumed that he
purchased them at par.) Trying, then, to purchase $125
of exchange on New York (New York bank notes), he said
he could not find a bank that would make such a trade
'at any price.' Since New York exchange was roughly
selling at par, the implication is that Owatonna money
was selling for less than 63 cents on the dollar. [Ames
eventually took his notes to Pease who, as Ames knew,
was the Owatonna broker. With some difficulty, Ames
persuaded Pease to buy the notes for St. Paul city
scrip, but could get neither New York exchange or gold
out of Pease.12°
This could be described as the behavior of the happy purchaser of small
denomination mutual fund securities, but it sounds more like the disgruntled
buyer of a used car who finds out that Honest Al has set back the odometer
even more than the buyer thought.
The paper by Economopoulos (1988) examines the case of Illinois.
Economopoulos, following Rolnick and Weber, tries to use Illinois to test
whether free bank failures were caused by wildcat banking or falling asset
prices.
Economopulos manages to reduce the number of wildcat banks in his
sample by using an extremely rigid and narrow definition of wildcat
banking. First, consider his definition of the expected lifespan of a
typical wildcat bank. Economoipulos takes one year as the maximum potential
life of a wildcat and concludes that any bank that survives longer lacks a
major defining characteristic. He gets his figure of one year from Rockoff
(1975, r•8)(an unfortuneate circumstance that somewhat reduces my ability
20Rolnick and Weber (1988), p. 69. The material in brackets is on p. 69
in footnote 10.
47to criticize his choice). But there I was asking a question, how could a
banker expect to make a profit if the bank could expect to last, say, one
year. I was not estimating the actual lifespan of such banks. The weasel
word "say" was inserted, moreover, precisely to avoid having to commit
myself to a precise numerical figure. Studies such as Economopoulos's can
help to give a more precise numerical content to the idea of the expected
lifespan of a wildcat bank, Clearly many of his banks lasted longer than a
year, and might have lasted much longer had the Civil War not undermined the
value of their southern bond security. How long they might have survived is
an open question.
Economopoulos reaches the conclusion that the Illinois banks were not
set up in inaccessible areas because only 10 banks in his sample violated an
express requirement of the law that they be located in towns of more than
200 inhabitants. He concludes that a majority were set up in highly
populated locations. But it seems more than passing strange that out of 93
banks set up in Illinois in this period, not one was set up in Chicago, the
commercial and transportation center of the midwest and, it is said, the
fastest growing city in the world. On the other hand, the town of New Haven
Illinois, a metropolis of 200 souls, merited 3 banks.
But even if wildcat banking was more frequent than some of these recent
papers suggest, it was still clearly a rare phenomenon, and was preventable,
by requiring a substantial backing for notes in bonds measured at market
prices.
11. Should We Turn the Clock Back to the Free Banking Era?
48The answer, of course, is that we could not do so even if we wanted to.
But more than that, it is clear that the free banking era does not represent
some ideal monetary system. There were problems: a major disturbance to the
stock of higlipowered money, a financial crisis of major proportions, and
wildcat banking on the frontier. Nevertheless, the system was sufficiently
successful to make a careful consideration of its major charateristics
worthwhile.
First, the control of the monetary base was left to a semi-automatic
mechanism: the bimetallic standard. This did not assure stability in the
growth of the monetary base. But the experience of the l8SOs shows that even
at its worse, the shocks to the monetary base under such a system are likely
to be rather mild. As we have seen above, even the gold rush boom of the
l850s produced little more monetary growth than we have observed in the
supposedly stable 1980s.
Second, the free banking system tried to get by without a lender of
last resort. The record here is not altogether encouraging for those
economists who argue that a lender of last resort is not needed. There was
a major crisis in 1857 that left a sharp recession and many business
failures in its wake. But some of the systems escaped the general
suspension of specie payments. Of particular interest are the branch
systems of Indiana and Ohio that were able to maintain general payments.
This adds a bit of support to the idea that banking panics in the nineteenth
century could have been ameliorated had branch banking been permitted.
Third, banks were permitted to issue hand to hand currency. This led, I
would argue, to a more satisfactory allocation of the seignorage, and to a
49damping down of the affect of changes in the note-to-moneyratio on the
stock of money.
Fourth, protection was provided for unsophisticated usersof the
banking system (noteholders) through the bond security system.It is hard to
imagine a system today that did not incorporate some protectionfor the
unsophisticated. collateralizing that part of the moneystock likely to be
used by the poor and undereducated was a straightforward wayof tackling the
problem. A similar arrangement today, one providing a highlevel of
protection for small depositors, while allowing mostothers to bear the
risks and earn the returns of unregulated deposits is well worth
considering.
Fifth, there was free entry into banking. It would be hard tomake the
case that free entry was crucial to the emergence of NewYork as the
nations's primary financial center, or to Chicago and New Orleans as
regional centers. Undoubtely their dominant positions inthe interregional
movements of agricultural commodities and other products were the key.
Nevertheless, at the margin the ease with which new banks could be started
must have helped.
The U.S. in the l840s and lBSOs was a politically troubled society; a
great Civil War lay close at hand. But it posssessed a rapidly growing
economy. The frontier was being settled rapidly and immigrants wereflooding
into the country. By 1860 the U.S. was the second leading industrial power
in the world. All this was carried out with a banking system designed to
minimize the role of government, maximize equality of economic opportunity,
and protect the legitimate interests of unsophisticated users of the banking
SOsystem. We can still learn something from an appreciation of such a banking
system.
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